| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: set the right AMDGPU sg segment limitation
The driver needs to set the correct max_segment_size;
otherwise debug_dma_map_sg() will complain about the
over-mapping of the AMDGPU sg length as following:
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 1964 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1178 debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049444] Modules linked in: veth amdgpu(OE) amdxcp drm_exec gpu_sched drm_buddy drm_ttm_helper ttm(OE) drm_suballoc_helper drm_display_helper drm_kms_helper i2c_algo_bit rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfs lockd grace netfs xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo iptable_nat xt_addrtype iptable_filter br_netfilter nvme_fabrics overlay nfnetlink_cttimeout nfnetlink openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 libcrc32c bridge stp llc amd_atl intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc sch_fq_codel snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_scodec_component snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg edac_mce_amd binfmt_misc snd_hda_codec snd_pci_acp6x snd_hda_core snd_acp_config snd_hwdep snd_soc_acpi kvm_amd snd_pcm kvm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_rawmidi sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel snd_seq nls_iso8859_1 crypto_simd snd_seq_device cryptd snd_timer rapl input_leds snd
[ 364.049532] ipmi_devintf wmi_bmof ccp serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco soundcore ipmi_msghandler cm32181 industrialio mac_hid msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables pci_stub crc32_pclmul nvme ahci libahci i2c_piix4 r8169 nvme_core i2c_designware_pci realtek i2c_ccgx_ucsi video wmi hid_generic cdc_ether usbnet usbhid hid r8152 mii
[ 364.049576] CPU: 6 PID: 1964 Comm: rocminfo Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-custom #492
[ 364.049579] Hardware name: AMD Majolica-RN/Majolica-RN, BIOS RMJ1009A 06/13/2021
[ 364.049582] RIP: 0010:debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049585] Code: 89 4d b8 e8 36 b1 86 00 8b 4d b8 48 8b 55 b0 44 8b 45 a8 4c 8b 4d a0 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 00 4b 74 bc 4c 89 4d b8 e8 b4 73 f3 ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 15 c8 2c b8 01 85 d2 0f 85 ee fd ff ff 8b 05
[ 364.049588] RSP: 0018:ffff9ca600b57ac0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 364.049590] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b7c132b0c8 RCX: 0000000000000027
[ 364.049592] RDX: ffff88bb0f521688 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88bb0f521680
[ 364.049594] RBP: ffff9ca600b57b20 R08: 000000000000006f R09: ffff9ca600b57930
[ 364.049596] R10: ffff9ca600b57928 R11: ffffffffbcb46328 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 364.049597] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88b7c19c0700 R15: ffff88b7c9059800
[ 364.049599] FS: 00007fb2d3516e80(0000) GS:ffff88bb0f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 364.049601] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 364.049603] CR2: 000055610bd03598 CR3: 00000001049f6000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 364.049605] Call Trace:
[ 364.049607] <TASK>
[ 364.049609] ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
[ 364.049614] ? __warn+0x8c/0x140
[ 364.049618] ? debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049621] ? report_bug+0x193/0x1a0
[ 364.049627] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
[ 364.049631] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
[ 364.049635] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
[ 364.049642] ? debug_dma_map_sg+0x2dc/0x370
[ 364.049647] __dma_map_sg_attrs+0x90/0xe0
[ 364.049651] dma_map_sgtable+0x25/0x40
[ 364.049654] amdgpu_bo_move+0x59a/0x850 [amdgpu]
[ 364.049935] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 364.049939] ? amdgpu_ttm_tt_populate+0x5d/0xc0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050095] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xc3/0x180 [ttm]
[ 364.050103] ttm_bo_validate+0xc1/0x160 [ttm]
[ 364.050108] ? amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages+0xe5/0x1b0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050263] amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0xa12/0xc90 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050473] kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x16b/0x3b0 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050680] kfd_ioctl+0x3c2/0x530 [amdgpu]
[ 364.050866] ? __pfx_kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[ 364.05105
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Call free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket()
For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the
last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke
bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However,
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock
(raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock
(spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted
-----------------------------
test_maps/4881 is trying to lock:
ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
2 locks held by test_maps/4881:
#0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270
#1: ffff888149ced148 (&htab->lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
__lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0
lock_acquire+0x182/0x450
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70
bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70
bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110
bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0
free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80
bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270
bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380
__sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60
x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for
map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes
idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a
similar lockdep warning because the slab's lock (s->cpu_slab->lock) is
still a spinlock.
Instead of changing map_idr_lock's type, fix the issue by invoking
htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring
the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map
pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion.
Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these
to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map.
There are four callers for ->map_fd_put_ptr:
(1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
It invokes ->map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of
htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(),
because the old element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems.
It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the
invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release
the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer
of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and
releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old
element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old
element as well.
(2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())
Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(),
htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch().
For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after
htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just
like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list
and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe
to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these
elements have been removed from the hash llist.
Because htab of maps doesn't support lookup_and_delete operation,
__htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn't have the problem, so kept
it as
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/deadline: Fix warning in migrate_enable for boosted tasks
When running the following command:
while true; do
stress-ng --cyclic 30 --timeout 30s --minimize --quiet
done
a warning is eventually triggered:
WARNING: CPU: 43 PID: 2848 at kernel/sched/deadline.c:794
setup_new_dl_entity+0x13e/0x180
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? enqueue_dl_entity+0x631/0x6e0
? setup_new_dl_entity+0x13e/0x180
? __warn+0x7e/0xd0
? report_bug+0x11a/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
enqueue_dl_entity+0x631/0x6e0
enqueue_task_dl+0x7d/0x120
__do_set_cpus_allowed+0xe3/0x280
__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked+0x140/0x1d0
__set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x54/0xa0
migrate_enable+0x7e/0x150
rt_spin_unlock+0x1c/0x90
group_send_sig_info+0xf7/0x1a0
? kill_pid_info+0x1f/0x1d0
kill_pid_info+0x78/0x1d0
kill_proc_info+0x5b/0x110
__x64_sys_kill+0x93/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
RIP: 0033:0x7f0dab31f92b
This warning occurs because set_cpus_allowed dequeues and enqueues tasks
with the ENQUEUE_RESTORE flag set. If the task is boosted, the warning
is triggered. A boosted task already had its parameters set by
rt_mutex_setprio, and a new call to setup_new_dl_entity is unnecessary,
hence the WARN_ON call.
Check if we are requeueing a boosted task and avoid calling
setup_new_dl_entity if that's the case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hyperv: streamline driver probe to avoid devres issues
It was found that unloading 'hid_hyperv' module results in a devres
complaint:
...
hv_vmbus: unregistering driver hid_hyperv
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3983 at drivers/base/devres.c:691 devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? __warn+0xd1/0x1c0
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? report_bug+0x32a/0x3c0
? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? devres_release_group+0x1f2/0x2c0
? devres_release_group+0x90/0x2c0
? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
? __pfx_devres_release_group+0x10/0x10
hid_device_remove+0xf5/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540
? klist_put+0xf3/0x170
bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
device_del+0x33f/0x8c0
? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
? cleanup_srcu_struct+0x337/0x500
hid_destroy_device+0xc8/0x130
mousevsc_remove+0xd2/0x1d0 [hid_hyperv]
device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x540
driver_detach+0xc5/0x180
bus_remove_driver+0x11e/0x2a0
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x160/0x5e0
vmbus_driver_unregister+0x62/0x2b0 [hv_vmbus]
...
And the issue seems to be that the corresponding devres group is not
allocated. Normally, devres_open_group() is called from
__hid_device_probe() but Hyper-V HID driver overrides 'hid_dev->driver'
with 'mousevsc_hid_driver' stub and basically re-implements
__hid_device_probe() by calling hid_parse() and hid_hw_start() but not
devres_open_group(). hid_device_probe() does not call __hid_device_probe()
for it. Later, when the driver is removed, hid_device_remove() calls
devres_release_group() as it doesn't check whether hdev->driver was
initially overridden or not.
The issue seems to be related to the commit 62c68e7cee33 ("HID: ensure
timely release of driver-allocated resources") but the commit itself seems
to be correct.
Fix the issue by dropping the 'hid_dev->driver' override and using
hid_register_driver()/hid_unregister_driver() instead. Alternatively, it
would have been possible to rely on the default handling but
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT implies HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW and it doesn't seem to work
for mousevsc as-is. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit()
Use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of is_64_bit_mode() to detect a 64-bit
hypercall when completing said hypercall. For guests with protected state,
e.g. SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, KVM must assume the hypercall was made in 64-bit
mode as the vCPU state needed to detect 64-bit mode is unavailable.
Hacking the sev_smoke_test selftest to generate a KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
hypercall via VMGEXIT trips the WARN:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 273 PID: 326626 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:180 complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm ... [last unloaded: kvm]
CPU: 273 UID: 0 PID: 326626 Comm: sev_smoke_test Not tainted 6.12.0-smp--392e932fa0f3-feat #470
Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20240617.0-0 06/17/2024
RIP: 0010:complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2400/0x2720 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x54f/0x630 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x6b/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/xen: don't do PV iret hypercall through hypercall page
Instead of jumping to the Xen hypercall page for doing the iret
hypercall, directly code the required sequence in xen-asm.S.
This is done in preparation of no longer using hypercall page at all,
as it has shown to cause problems with speculation mitigations.
This is part of XSA-466 / CVE-2024-53241. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Don't retire aborted MMIO instruction
Returning an abort to the guest for an unsupported MMIO access is a
documented feature of the KVM UAPI. Nevertheless, it's clear that this
plumbing has seen limited testing, since userspace can trivially cause a
WARN in the MMIO return:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30558 at arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536 kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
Call trace:
kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x98/0x15b4 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1133
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x75c/0xa78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4487
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x14c/0x1c8 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x1e0/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x38/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The splat is complaining that KVM is advancing PC while an exception is
pending, i.e. that KVM is retiring the MMIO instruction despite a
pending synchronous external abort. Womp womp.
Fix the glaring UAPI bug by skipping over all the MMIO emulation in
case there is a pending synchronous exception. Note that while userspace
is capable of pending an asynchronous exception (SError, IRQ, or FIQ),
it is still safe to retire the MMIO instruction in this case as (1) they
are by definition asynchronous, and (2) KVM relies on hardware support
for pending/delivering these exceptions instead of the software state
machine for advancing PC. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Get rid of userspace_irqchip_in_use
Improper use of userspace_irqchip_in_use led to syzbot hitting the
following WARN_ON() in kvm_timer_update_irq():
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3281 at arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:459
kvm_timer_update_irq+0x21c/0x394
Call trace:
kvm_timer_update_irq+0x21c/0x394 arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:459
kvm_timer_vcpu_reset+0x158/0x684 arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:968
kvm_reset_vcpu+0x3b4/0x560 arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c:264
kvm_vcpu_set_target arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1553 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1573 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x112c/0x1b3c arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1695
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ec/0xf74 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4658
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x108/0x184 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x1b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0xe8/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x40/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x54/0x14c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The following sequence led to the scenario:
- Userspace creates a VM and a vCPU.
- The vCPU is initialized with KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3 during
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT.
- Without any other setup, such as vGIC or vPMU, userspace issues
KVM_RUN on the vCPU. Since the vPMU is requested, but not setup,
kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable() fails in kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change().
As a result, KVM_RUN returns after enabling the timer, but before
incrementing 'userspace_irqchip_in_use':
kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change()
ret = kvm_arm_pmu_v3_enable()
if (!vcpu->arch.pmu.created)
return -EINVAL;
if (ret)
return ret;
[...]
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
static_branch_inc(&userspace_irqchip_in_use);
- Userspace ignores the error and issues KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT again.
Since the timer is already enabled, control moves through the
following flow, ultimately hitting the WARN_ON():
kvm_timer_vcpu_reset()
if (timer->enabled)
kvm_timer_update_irq()
if (!userspace_irqchip())
ret = kvm_vgic_inject_irq()
ret = vgic_lazy_init()
if (unlikely(!vgic_initialized(kvm)))
if (kvm->arch.vgic.vgic_model !=
KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V2)
return -EBUSY;
WARN_ON(ret);
Theoretically, since userspace_irqchip_in_use's functionality can be
simply replaced by '!irqchip_in_kernel()', get rid of the static key
to avoid the mismanagement, which also helps with the syzbot issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: fix bounds checker error in nl80211_parse_sched_scan
The channels array in the cfg80211_scan_request has a __counted_by
attribute attached to it, which points to the n_channels variable. This
attribute is used in bounds checking, and if it is not set before the
array is filled, then the bounds sanitizer will issue a warning or a
kernel panic if CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP is set.
This patch sets the size of allocated memory as the initial value for
n_channels. It is updated with the actual number of added elements after
the array is filled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubi: fastmap: Fix duplicate slab cache names while attaching
Since commit 4c39529663b9 ("slab: Warn on duplicate cache names when
DEBUG_VM=y"), the duplicate slab cache names can be detected and a
kernel WARNING is thrown out.
In UBI fast attaching process, alloc_ai() could be invoked twice
with the same slab cache name 'ubi_aeb_slab_cache', which will trigger
following warning messages:
kmem_cache of name 'ubi_aeb_slab_cache' already exists
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7519 at mm/slab_common.c:107
__kmem_cache_create_args+0x100/0x5f0
Modules linked in: ubi(+) nandsim [last unloaded: nandsim]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7519 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G 6.12.0-rc2
RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_create_args+0x100/0x5f0
Call Trace:
__kmem_cache_create_args+0x100/0x5f0
alloc_ai+0x295/0x3f0 [ubi]
ubi_attach+0x3c3/0xcc0 [ubi]
ubi_attach_mtd_dev+0x17cf/0x3fa0 [ubi]
ubi_init+0x3fb/0x800 [ubi]
do_init_module+0x265/0x7d0
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x7a/0xc0
The problem could be easily reproduced by loading UBI device by fastmap
with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y.
Fix it by using different slab names for alloc_ai() callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_payload: sanitize offset and length before calling skb_checksum()
If access to offset + length is larger than the skbuff length, then
skb_checksum() triggers BUG_ON().
skb_checksum() internally subtracts the length parameter while iterating
over skbuff, BUG_ON(len) at the end of it checks that the expected
length to be included in the checksum calculation is fully consumed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Use raw_spinlock_t in ringbuf
The function __bpf_ringbuf_reserve is invoked from a tracepoint, which
disables preemption. Using spinlock_t in this context can lead to a
"sleep in atomic" warning in the RT variant. This issue is illustrated
in the example below:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 556208, name: test_progs
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffd33a5c88ea44>] migrate_enable+0xc0/0x39c
CPU: 7 PID: 556208 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G
Hardware name: Qualcomm SA8775P Ride (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xac/0x130
show_stack+0x1c/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe8
dump_stack+0x18/0x30
__might_resched+0x3bc/0x4fc
rt_spin_lock+0x8c/0x1a4
__bpf_ringbuf_reserve+0xc4/0x254
bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr+0x5c/0xdc
bpf_prog_ac3d15160d62622a_test_read_write+0x104/0x238
trace_call_bpf+0x238/0x774
perf_call_bpf_enter.isra.0+0x104/0x194
perf_syscall_enter+0x2f8/0x510
trace_sys_enter+0x39c/0x564
syscall_trace_enter+0x220/0x3c0
do_el0_svc+0x138/0x1dc
el0_svc+0x54/0x130
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150
el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180
Switch the spinlock to raw_spinlock_t to avoid this error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vboxvideo: Replace fake VLA at end of vbva_mouse_pointer_shape with real VLA
Replace the fake VLA at end of the vbva_mouse_pointer_shape shape with
a real VLA to fix a "memcpy: detected field-spanning write error" warning:
[ 13.319813] memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16896) of single field "p->data" at drivers/gpu/drm/vboxvideo/hgsmi_base.c:154 (size 4)
[ 13.319841] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1105 at drivers/gpu/drm/vboxvideo/hgsmi_base.c:154 hgsmi_update_pointer_shape+0x192/0x1c0 [vboxvideo]
[ 13.320038] Call Trace:
[ 13.320173] hgsmi_update_pointer_shape [vboxvideo]
[ 13.320184] vbox_cursor_atomic_update [vboxvideo]
Note as mentioned in the added comment it seems the original length
calculation for the allocated and send hgsmi buffer is 4 bytes too large.
Changing this is not the goal of this patch, so this behavior is kept. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap
When copying data to user-space we should ensure that only valid
data is copied over. Padding in structures may be filled with
random (possibly sensitve) data and should never be given directly
to user-space.
This patch fixes the copying of xfrm algorithms and the encap
template in xfrm_user so that padding is zeroed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
srcu: Delegate work to the boot cpu if using SRCU_SIZE_SMALL
Commit 994f706872e6 ("srcu: Make Tree SRCU able to operate without
snp_node array") assumes that cpu 0 is always online. However, there
really are situations when some other CPU is the boot CPU, for example,
when booting a kdump kernel with the maxcpus=1 boot parameter.
On PowerPC, the kdump kernel can hang as follows:
...
[ 1.740036] systemd[1]: Hostname set to <xyz.com>
[ 243.686240] INFO: task systemd:1 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[ 243.686264] Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1 #1
[ 243.686272] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 243.686281] task:systemd state:D stack:0 pid:1 ppid:0 flags:0x00042000
[ 243.686296] Call Trace:
[ 243.686301] [c000000016657640] [c000000016657670] 0xc000000016657670 (unreliable)
[ 243.686317] [c000000016657830] [c00000001001dec0] __switch_to+0x130/0x220
[ 243.686333] [c000000016657890] [c000000010f607b8] __schedule+0x1f8/0x580
[ 243.686347] [c000000016657940] [c000000010f60bb4] schedule+0x74/0x140
[ 243.686361] [c0000000166579b0] [c000000010f699b8] schedule_timeout+0x168/0x1c0
[ 243.686374] [c000000016657a80] [c000000010f61de8] __wait_for_common+0x148/0x360
[ 243.686387] [c000000016657b20] [c000000010176bb0] __flush_work.isra.0+0x1c0/0x3d0
[ 243.686401] [c000000016657bb0] [c0000000105f2768] fsnotify_wait_marks_destroyed+0x28/0x40
[ 243.686415] [c000000016657bd0] [c0000000105f21b8] fsnotify_destroy_group+0x68/0x160
[ 243.686428] [c000000016657c40] [c0000000105f6500] inotify_release+0x30/0xa0
[ 243.686440] [c000000016657cb0] [c0000000105751a8] __fput+0xc8/0x350
[ 243.686452] [c000000016657d00] [c00000001017d524] task_work_run+0xe4/0x170
[ 243.686464] [c000000016657d50] [c000000010020e94] do_notify_resume+0x134/0x140
[ 243.686478] [c000000016657d80] [c00000001002eb18] interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x198/0x270
[ 243.686493] [c000000016657de0] [c00000001002ec60] syscall_exit_prepare+0x70/0x180
[ 243.686505] [c000000016657e10] [c00000001000bf7c] system_call_vectored_common+0xfc/0x280
[ 243.686520] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fffa47d5ba4
[ 243.686528] NIP: 00007fffa47d5ba4 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
[ 243.686538] REGS: c000000016657e80 TRAP: 3000 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc1)
[ 243.686548] MSR: 800000000000d033 <SF,EE,PR,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 42044440 XER: 00000000
[ 243.686572] IRQMASK: 0
[ 243.686572] GPR00: 0000000000000006 00007ffffa606710 00007fffa48e7200 0000000000000000
[ 243.686572] GPR04: 0000000000000002 000000000000000a 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 243.686572] GPR08: 000001000c172dd0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 243.686572] GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007fffa4ff4bc0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 243.686572] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 243.686572] GPR20: 0000000132dfdc50 000000000000000e 0000000000189375 0000000000000000
[ 243.686572] GPR24: 00007ffffa606ae0 0000000000000005 000001000c185490 000001000c172570
[ 243.686572] GPR28: 000001000c172990 000001000c184850 000001000c172e00 00007fffa4fedd98
[ 243.686683] NIP [00007fffa47d5ba4] 0x7fffa47d5ba4
[ 243.686691] LR [0000000000000000] 0x0
[ 243.686698] --- interrupt: 3000
[ 243.686708] INFO: task kworker/u16:1:24 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[ 243.686717] Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1 #1
[ 243.686724] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 243.686733] task:kworker/u16:1 state:D stack:0 pid:24 ppid:2 flags:0x00000800
[ 243.686747] Workqueue: events_unbound fsnotify_mark_destroy_workfn
[ 243.686758] Call Trace:
[ 243.686762] [c0000000166736e0] [c00000004fd91000] 0xc00000004fd91000 (unreliable)
[ 243.686775] [c0000000166738d0] [c00000001001dec0] __switch_to+0x130/0x220
[ 243.686788] [c000000016673930] [c000000010f607b8] __schedule+0x1f8/0x
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nSVM: Check instead of asserting on nested TSC scaling support
Check for nested TSC scaling support on nested SVM VMRUN instead of
asserting that TSC scaling is exposed to L1 if L1's MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO
has diverged from KVM's default. Userspace can trigger the WARN at will
by writing the MSR and then updating guest CPUID to hide the feature
(modifying guest CPUID is allowed anytime before KVM_RUN). E.g. hacking
KVM's state_test selftest to do
vcpu_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, 0);
vcpu_clear_cpuid_feature(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
after restoring state in a new VM+vCPU yields an endless supply of:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 164 PID: 62565 at arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c:699
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control+0x3d6/0x3f0 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
enter_svm_guest_mode+0x114/0x560 [kvm_amd]
nested_svm_vmrun+0x260/0x330 [kvm_amd]
vmrun_interception+0x29/0x30 [kvm_amd]
svm_invoke_exit_handler+0x35/0x100 [kvm_amd]
svm_handle_exit+0xe7/0x180 [kvm_amd]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1eab/0x2570 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4c9/0x5b0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x7a/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x41/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x45ca1b
Note, the nested #VMEXIT path has the same flaw, but needs a different
fix and will be handled separately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers/perf: hisi: Don't migrate perf to the CPU going to teardown
The driver needs to migrate the perf context if the current using CPU going
to teardown. By the time calling the cpuhp::teardown() callback the
cpu_online_mask() hasn't updated yet and still includes the CPU going to
teardown. In current driver's implementation we may migrate the context
to the teardown CPU and leads to the below calltrace:
...
[ 368.104662][ T932] task:cpuhp/0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 15 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000008
[ 368.113699][ T932] Call trace:
[ 368.116834][ T932] __switch_to+0x7c/0xbc
[ 368.120924][ T932] __schedule+0x338/0x6f0
[ 368.125098][ T932] schedule+0x50/0xe0
[ 368.128926][ T932] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x24
[ 368.134229][ T932] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x1d4/0x5dc
[ 368.139617][ T932] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1c/0x30
[ 368.144573][ T932] mutex_lock+0x50/0x60
[ 368.148579][ T932] perf_pmu_migrate_context+0x84/0x2b0
[ 368.153884][ T932] hisi_pcie_pmu_offline_cpu+0x90/0xe0 [hisi_pcie_pmu]
[ 368.160579][ T932] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2a0/0x650
[ 368.165707][ T932] cpuhp_thread_fun+0xe4/0x190
[ 368.170316][ T932] smpboot_thread_fn+0x15c/0x1a0
[ 368.175099][ T932] kthread+0x108/0x13c
[ 368.179012][ T932] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
...
Use function cpumask_any_but() to find one correct active cpu to fixes
this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: reduce WARN to dev_dbg() in callback
The warn is triggered on a known race condition, documented in the code above
the test, that is correctly handled. Using WARN() hinders automated testing.
Reducing severity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm integrity: call kmem_cache_destroy() in dm_integrity_init() error path
Otherwise the journal_io_cache will leak if dm_register_target() fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: do not assume skb mac_header is set
Drivers must not assume in their ndo_start_xmit() that
skbs have their mac_header set. skb->data is all what is needed.
bonding seems to be one of the last offender as caught by syzbot:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12155 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2907 skb_mac_offset include/linux/skbuff.h:2913 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12155 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2907 bond_xmit_hash drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4170 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12155 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2907 bond_xmit_3ad_xor_slave_get drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5149 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12155 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2907 bond_3ad_xor_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5186 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12155 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2907 __bond_start_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5442 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 12155 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2907 bond_start_xmit+0x14ab/0x19d0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5470
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 12155 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.1.30-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/25/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2907 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_offset include/linux/skbuff.h:2913 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bond_xmit_hash drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4170 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bond_xmit_3ad_xor_slave_get drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5149 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bond_3ad_xor_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5186 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__bond_start_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5442 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bond_start_xmit+0x14ab/0x19d0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5470
Code: 8b 7c 24 30 e8 76 dd 1a 01 48 85 c0 74 0d 48 89 c3 e8 29 67 2e fe e9 15 ef ff ff e8 1f 67 2e fe e9 10 ef ff ff e8 15 67 2e fe <0f> 0b e9 45 f8 ff ff e8 09 67 2e fe e9 dc fa ff ff e8 ff 66 2e fe
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002fff6e0 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff835874db RBX: 000000000000ffff RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc90004dcf000 RSI: 00000000000000b5 RDI: 00000000000000b6
RBP: ffffc90002fff8b8 R08: ffffffff83586d16 R09: ffffffff83586584
R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff8881599fc780 R12: ffff88811b6a7b7e
R13: 1ffff110236d4f6f R14: ffff88811b6a7ac0 R15: 1ffff110236d4f76
FS: 00007f2e9eb47700(0000) GS:ffff8881f6b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2e421000 CR3: 000000010e6d4000 CR4: 00000000003526e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[<ffffffff8471a49f>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4925 [inline]
[<ffffffff8471a49f>] __dev_direct_xmit+0x4ef/0x850 net/core/dev.c:4380
[<ffffffff851d845b>] dev_direct_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3043 [inline]
[<ffffffff851d845b>] packet_direct_xmit+0x18b/0x300 net/packet/af_packet.c:284
[<ffffffff851c7472>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3112 [inline]
[<ffffffff851c7472>] packet_sendmsg+0x4a22/0x64d0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3143
[<ffffffff8467a4b2>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
[<ffffffff8467a4b2>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline]
[<ffffffff8467a4b2>] __sys_sendto+0x472/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2139
[<ffffffff8467a715>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2151 [inline]
[<ffffffff8467a715>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2147 [inline]
[<ffffffff8467a715>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x100 net/socket.c:2147
[<ffffffff8553071f>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff8553071f>] do_syscall_64+0x2f/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff85600087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd |
