| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| zbateson/mail-mime-parser is a mail mime parser alternative to PHP's imap* functions and Pear libraries for reading messages in Internet Message Format RFC 822. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 3.0.6 and 4.0.2, an uncontrolled resource consumption / algorithmic complexity vulnerability (CWE-400) affects any application that parses untrusted email with this library. Three independent parsing paths are super-linear in cost, so a byte-size cap on the caller side does **not** bound the work done. A crafted message under 2 MB can consume seconds of CPU or hundreds of megabytes to multiple gigabytes of memory (leading to an out-of-memory kill), enabling denial of service. The parse is lazy, but the cost is paid on the first `getAllParts()` or content read. This is fxed in 4.0.2 and 3.0.6. The fixes add configurable limits on multipart nesting depth and on header count / total header size (recording a parse error past the threshold rather than throwing), and change sibling append to O(n). Users should upgrade to one of these (or later) versions. Versions 2.x are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive patches; users on those lines should upgrade to a fixed release. (Versions prior to 2.0 used a different parser and are not affected by all three paths.) These costs are super-linear, so an input byte-size cap alone does not bound them. Until upgrading, restrict exposure of the parser to untrusted input, and run parsing under a constrained memory_limit and execution time limit so a malicious message fails its own request rather than exhausting the host. |
| pbkdf2 through 3.1.6 re-hashes passwords longer than the digest's block size on every iteration in its JavaScript fallback (lib/sync.js). A password longer than the block size (64 bytes, or 128 bytes for sha384 and sha512) is passed to HMAC as the key on every iteration, and HMAC hashes such keys in full each time. Cost is therefore O(iterations × password length), and a long password can block the event loop. The fallback is used by pbkdf2Sync and pbkdf2 on Node.js before 0.12, on Bun (1.0.0 through 1.1.34, and 1.2.6 and later), and on Deno 2.9.0 and later, because their native pbkdf2Sync fails the library's feature check. It is also used when lib/sync.js is imported directly. Node.js 0.12 and later, and browser builds (which use lib/sync-browser.js), are not affected. Applications that enforce a reasonable maximum password length are not meaningfully affected. |
| Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.17.Final contain an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in the QPACK encoder-stream instruction decoder (QpackEncoderHandler, installed on the peer-initiated unidirectional QPACK encoder stream, type 0x02). The handler accepts an attacker-declared string-literal length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE (~2 GiB) for the Name Length and Value Length fields of the "Insert With Literal Name" instruction (RFC 9204 §4.3.3), with no per-instruction or per-literal length cap and no cumulation-size limit; the existing HTTP/3 limits (maxHeaderListSize, maxUnknownFramePayloadLength, DEFAULT_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE) are not applied to this handler. A remote, unauthenticated peer with an established HTTP/3 connection to a default Netty HTTP/3 server can declare a very large literal length and then trickle fewer bytes than declared, causing the ByteToMessageDecoder MERGE cumulator to retain and grow the per-connection buffer, and ultimately triggering a large byte-array allocation. This leads to unbounded per-connection heap growth and OutOfMemoryError, resulting in denial of service. Fixed in 4.2.18.Final. |
| vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact. |
| In Wind River VxWorks 7 prior to 26.09, specific system call arguments can result in the process management subsystem failing to properly release allocated kernel memory before terminating the calling application. Fixed in Version 26.09 |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) in Elasticsearch can lead denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) in Elasticsearch can lead denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) |
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, summary An unauthenticated request to POST /api/v1/import/otrs/import_check blocks a Zammad request worker for roughly two minutes. The import_check and import_status actions are missing the setup_done_response guard that other actions in the same controller carry, so they execute on fully set-up production instances. The action enters a retry loop against a blank OTRS endpoint, sleeping for 30 s + 45 s between attempts. Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker denies service to a production Zammad instance. Each request costs almost nothing and forces ~115 seconds of server-side blocking. A few requests per second saturate the Puma worker pool. The condition persists as long as the traffic continues. No account, valid import configuration, or target knowledge beyond the hostname is needed. CSRF token is trivially obtained from any prior GET response. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.2. |
| The brace-expansion library generates arbitrary strings containing a common prefix and suffix. Prior to 1.1.21, 2.1.7, 3.0.9, and 5.0.12, the expand function handles untrusted {a},b}-shaped patterns with many trailing closing braces by restarting its scan once for each trailing closing brace. The successive full-input rescans with linear working-string growth cause quadratic CPU time and memory pressure that can block the Node.js event loop. The process eventually recovers, making the impact a recoverable CPU denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 1.1.21, 2.1.7, 3.0.9, and 5.0.12. |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) in Elasticsearch can lead denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) in Kibana can lead denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) in Elasticsearch can lead denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) in Elasticsearch can lead to denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) in Elasticsearch can lead to denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). |
| NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause uncontrolled resource consumption. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. |
| NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker may cause uncontrolled resource consumption. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to denial of service. |
| The openml/openml.org web application version v2.0.20241110 uses predictable MD5-based tokens for critical user workflows such as signup confirmation, password resets, email confirmation resends, and email change confirmation. These tokens are generated by hashing the current timestamp formatted as "%d %H:%M:%S" without incorporating any user-specific data or cryptographic randomness. This predictability allows remote attackers to brute-force valid tokens within a small time window, enabling unauthorized account confirmation, password resets, and email change approvals, potentially leading to account takeover. |
| The brace-expansion library generates arbitrary strings containing a common prefix and suffix. Prior to 1.1.19, 2.1.5, 3.0.7, and 5.0.10, crafted brace patterns can exhaust the native stack in parseCommaParts because parseCommaParts recursively processes the remainder once per brace group and uses push.apply to pass every element of a very large comma-part array as a function argument. Patterns containing many comma-separated brace groups trigger the recursive path, while the large array triggers the argument-array path without deep recursion. These paths cause recursive and argument-array native stack exhaustion before max or maxLength can limit output, potentially terminating the Node.js process in a process-terminating denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 1.1.19, 2.1.5, 3.0.7, and 5.0.10. |
| Net::IDN::Punycode versions from 2.302 before 2.590 for Perl leak the output buffer on every rejected label in decode_punycode.
The XS backend allocates the scalar it returns before it validates the input, sizing the buffer at twice the input length. The scalar is released only on the success path, so each of the three croaks that reject a label leaves the scalar and its buffer allocated. Nothing bounds the label length in the to-Unicode direction, since the 63-byte DNS limit is checked only when converting to ASCII.
Only the XS backend is affected.
A sender who supplies invalid labels grows the process by twice the label length per rejected call, with no successful call needed. |
| Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic insertion cost when decoding a long label in decode_punycode.
The XS backend inserts each decoded code point into a UTF-8 buffer and finds the insertion point by scanning that buffer from the start, one character at a time. The scan runs once per code point over the output built so far, so the cost is quadratic in the label length. The pure-Perl backend downgrades its input to bytes so that substr can index it directly, but takes its working copy before the downgrade, so when the input carries the UTF-8 flag every substr on the copy scans from the start, with the same quadratic cost.
Nothing bounds the label length in the to-Unicode direction. The 63-byte DNS limit is checked only when converting to ASCII, so domain_to_unicode and uts46_to_unicode pass an attacker-supplied label of any length to the decoder. |
